The Self-Interest of Adolescents Overrules Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
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eLife Assessment
This valuable work investigates cooperative behaviors in adolescents using a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game. The computational modeling approach used in the study is solid and well established, yet evidence supporting certain claims remains incomplete. The work could be strengthened with the consideration of additional experimental contexts, non-linear relationships between age and observed behavior, and modeling details. If these concerns are addressed, the results will be of interest to developmental psychologists, economists, and social psychologists.
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Abstract
Abstract
Cooperation is essential for success in society. Research consistently showed that adolescents are less cooperative than adults, which is often attributed to underdeveloped mentalizing that limits their expectations of others. However, the internal computations underlying this reduced cooperation remain largely unexplored. This study compared cooperation between adolescents and adults using a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. Adolescents cooperated less than adults, particularly after their partner’s cooperation. Computational modeling revealed that adults increased their intrinsic reward for reciprocating when their partner continued cooperating, a pattern absent in adolescents. Both computational modeling and self-reported ratings showed that adolescents did not differ from adults in building expectations of their partner’s cooperation. Therefore, the reduced cooperation appears driven by a lower intrinsic reward for reciprocity, reflecting a stronger motive to prioritize self-interest, rather than a deficiency in mentalizing or social learning. These findings provide insights into the developmental trajectory of cooperation from adolescence to adulthood.
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eLife Assessment
This valuable work investigates cooperative behaviors in adolescents using a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game. The computational modeling approach used in the study is solid and well established, yet evidence supporting certain claims remains incomplete. The work could be strengthened with the consideration of additional experimental contexts, non-linear relationships between age and observed behavior, and modeling details. If these concerns are addressed, the results will be of interest to developmental psychologists, economists, and social psychologists.
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Reviewer #1 (Public review):
Summary:
Wu and colleagues aimed to explain previous findings that adolescents, compared to adults, show reduced cooperation following cooperative behaviour from a partner in several social scenarios. The authors analysed behavioural data from adolescents and adults performing a zero-sum Prisoner's Dilemma task and compared a range of social and non-social reinforcement learning models to identify potential algorithmic differences. Their findings suggest that adolescents' lower cooperation is best explained by a reduced learning rate for cooperative outcomes, rather than differences in prior expectations about the cooperativeness of a partner. The authors situate their results within the broader literature, proposing that adolescents' behaviour reflects a stronger preference for self-interest rather than a …
Reviewer #1 (Public review):
Summary:
Wu and colleagues aimed to explain previous findings that adolescents, compared to adults, show reduced cooperation following cooperative behaviour from a partner in several social scenarios. The authors analysed behavioural data from adolescents and adults performing a zero-sum Prisoner's Dilemma task and compared a range of social and non-social reinforcement learning models to identify potential algorithmic differences. Their findings suggest that adolescents' lower cooperation is best explained by a reduced learning rate for cooperative outcomes, rather than differences in prior expectations about the cooperativeness of a partner. The authors situate their results within the broader literature, proposing that adolescents' behaviour reflects a stronger preference for self-interest rather than a deficit in mentalising.
Strengths:
The work as a whole suggests that, in line with past work, adolescents prioritise value accumulation, and this can be, in part, explained by algorithmic differences in weighted value learning. The authors situate their work very clearly in past literature, and make it obvious the gap they are testing and trying to explain. The work also includes social contexts that move the field beyond non-social value accumulation in adolescents. The authors compare a series of formal approaches that might explain the results and establish generative and model-comparison procedures to demonstrate the validity of their winning model and individual parameters. The writing was clear, and the presentation of the results was logical and well-structured.
Weaknesses:
I also have some concerns about the methods used to fit and approximate parameters of interest. Namely, the use of maximum likelihood versus hierarchical methods to fit models on an individual level, which may reduce some of the outliers noted in the supplement, and also may improve model identifiability.
There was also little discussion given the structure of the Prisoner's Dilemma, and the strategy of the game (that defection is always dominant), meaning that the preferences of the adolescents cannot necessarily be distinguished from the incentives of the game, i.e. they may seem less cooperative simply because they want to play the dominant strategy, rather than a lower preferences for cooperation if all else was the same.
Appraisal & Discussion:
The authors have partially achieved their aims, but I believe the manuscript would benefit from additional methodological clarification, specifically regarding the use of hierarchical model fitting and the inclusion of Bayes Factors, to more robustly support their conclusions. It would also be important to investigate the source of the model confusion observed in two of their models.
I am unconvinced by the claim that failures in mentalising have been empirically ruled out, even though I am theoretically inclined to believe that adolescents can mentalise using the same procedures as adults. While reinforcement learning models are useful for identifying biases in learning weights, they do not directly capture formal representations of others' mental states. Greater clarity on this point is needed in the discussion, or a toning down of this language.
Additionally, a more detailed discussion of the incentives embedded in the Prisoner's Dilemma task would be valuable. In particular, the authors' interpretation of reduced adolescent cooperativeness might be reconsidered in light of the zero-sum nature of the game, which differs from broader conceptualisations of cooperation in contexts where defection is not structurally incentivised.
Overall, I believe this work has the potential to make a meaningful contribution to the field. Its impact would be strengthened by more rigorous modelling checks and fitting procedures, as well as by framing the findings in terms of the specific game-theoretic context, rather than general cooperation.
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Reviewer #2 (Public review):
Summary:
This manuscript investigates age-related differences in cooperative behavior by comparing adolescents and adults in a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Game (rPDG). The authors find that adolescents exhibit lower levels of cooperation than adults. Specifically, adolescents reciprocate partners' cooperation to a lesser degree than adults do. Through computational modeling, they show that this relatively low cooperation rate is not due to impaired expectations or mentalizing deficits, but rather a diminished intrinsic reward for reciprocity. A social reinforcement learning model with asymmetric learning rate best captured these dynamics, revealing age-related differences in how positive and negative outcomes drive behavioral updates. These findings contribute to understanding the developmental trajectory of …
Reviewer #2 (Public review):
Summary:
This manuscript investigates age-related differences in cooperative behavior by comparing adolescents and adults in a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Game (rPDG). The authors find that adolescents exhibit lower levels of cooperation than adults. Specifically, adolescents reciprocate partners' cooperation to a lesser degree than adults do. Through computational modeling, they show that this relatively low cooperation rate is not due to impaired expectations or mentalizing deficits, but rather a diminished intrinsic reward for reciprocity. A social reinforcement learning model with asymmetric learning rate best captured these dynamics, revealing age-related differences in how positive and negative outcomes drive behavioral updates. These findings contribute to understanding the developmental trajectory of cooperation and highlight adolescence as a period marked by heightened sensitivity to immediate rewards at the expense of long-term prosocial gains.
Strengths:
(1) Rigid model comparison and parameter recovery procedure.
(2) Conceptually comprehensive model space.
(3) Well-powered samples.
Weaknesses:
(1) A key conceptual distinction between learning from non-human agents (e.g., bandit machines) and human partners is that the latter are typically assumed to possess stable behavioral dispositions or moral traits. When a non-human source abruptly shifts behavior (e.g., from 80% to 20% reward), learners may simply update their expectations. In contrast, a sudden behavioral shift by a previously cooperative human partner can prompt higher-order inferences about the partner's trustworthiness or the integrity of the experimental setup (e.g., whether the partner is truly interactive or human). The authors may consider whether their modeling framework captures such higher-order social inferences. Specifically, trait-based models-such as those explored in Hackel et al. (2015, Nature Neuroscience)-suggest that learners form enduring beliefs about others' moral dispositions, which then modulate trial-by-trial learning. A learner who believes their partner is inherently cooperative may update less in response to a surprising defection, effectively showing a trait-based dampening of learning rate.
(2) This asymmetry in belief updating has been observed in prior work (e.g., Siegel et al., 2018, Nature Human Behaviour) and could be captured using a dynamic or belief-weighted learning rate. Models incorporating such mechanisms (e.g., dynamic learning rate models as in Jian Li et al., 2011, Nature Neuroscience) could better account for flexible adjustments in response to surprising behavior, particularly in the social domain.
(3) Second, the developmental interpretation of the observed effects would be strengthened by considering possible non-linear relationships between age and model parameters. For instance, certain cognitive or affective traits relevant to social learning-such as sensitivity to reciprocity or reward updating-may follow non-monotonic trajectories, peaking in late adolescence or early adulthood. Fitting age as a continuous variable, possibly with quadratic or spline terms, may yield more nuanced developmental insights.
(4) Finally, the two age groups compared - adolescents (high school students) and adults (university students) - differ not only in age but also in sociocultural and economic backgrounds. High school students are likely more homogenous in regional background (e.g., Beijing locals), while university students may be drawn from a broader geographic and socioeconomic pool. Additionally, differences in financial independence, family structure (e.g., single-child status), and social network complexity may systematically affect cooperative behavior and valuation of rewards. Although these factors are difficult to control fully, the authors should more explicitly address the extent to which their findings reflect biological development versus social and contextual influences.
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Reviewer #3 (Public review):
Summary:
Wu and colleagues find that in a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, adolescents, compared to adults, are less likely to increase their cooperation behavior in response to repeated cooperation from a simulated partner. In contrast, after repeated defection by the partner, both age groups show comparable behavior.
To uncover the mechanisms underlying these patterns, the authors compare eight different models. They report that a social reward learning model, which includes separate learning rates for positive and negative prediction errors, best fits the behavior of both groups. Key parameters in this winning model vary with age: notably, the intrinsic value of cooperating is lower in adolescents. Adults and adolescents also differ in learning rates for positive and negative prediction errors, as well as in …
Reviewer #3 (Public review):
Summary:
Wu and colleagues find that in a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, adolescents, compared to adults, are less likely to increase their cooperation behavior in response to repeated cooperation from a simulated partner. In contrast, after repeated defection by the partner, both age groups show comparable behavior.
To uncover the mechanisms underlying these patterns, the authors compare eight different models. They report that a social reward learning model, which includes separate learning rates for positive and negative prediction errors, best fits the behavior of both groups. Key parameters in this winning model vary with age: notably, the intrinsic value of cooperating is lower in adolescents. Adults and adolescents also differ in learning rates for positive and negative prediction errors, as well as in the inverse temperature parameter.
Strengths:
The modeling results are compelling in their ability to distinguish between learned expectations and the intrinsic value of cooperation. The authors skillfully compare relevant models to demonstrate which mechanisms drive cooperation behavior in the two age groups.
Weaknesses:
Some of the claims made are not fully supported by the data:
The central parameter reflecting preference for cooperation is positive in both groups. Thus, framing the results as self-interest versus other-interest may be misleading.
It is unclear why the authors assume adolescents and adults have the same expectations about the partner's cooperation, yet simultaneously demonstrate age-related differences in learning about the partner. To support their claim mechanistically, simulations showing that differences in cooperation preference (i.e., the w parameter), rather than differences in learning, drive behavioral differences would be helpful.
Two different schedules of 120 trials were used: one with stable partner behavior and one with behavior changing after 20 trials. While results for order effects are reported, the results for the stable vs. changing phases within each schedule are not. Since learning is influenced by reward structure, it is important to test whether key findings hold across both phases.
The division of participants at the legal threshold of 18 years should be more explicitly justified. The age distribution appears continuous rather than clearly split. Providing rationale and including continuous analyses would clarify how groupings were determined.
Claims of null effects (e.g., in the abstract: "adults increased their intrinsic reward for reciprocating... a pattern absent in adolescents") should be supported with appropriate statistics, such as Bayesian regression.
Once claims are more closely aligned with the data, the study will offer a valuable contribution to the field, given its use of relevant models and a well-established paradigm.
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