Who Pays for the Church? Religious Clientelism and Broker Compensation in Postwar Italy

In many contexts, religious leaders mobilize support for allied politicians. These mobilization efforts are often part of informal agreements in which politicians promise material compensation once elected, but may later shirk on their commitments. Given this uncertainty, little is known about how and when politicians compensate the brokerage of religious leaders. We study the compensation choices of elected politicians in a weakly institutionalized setting where religious brokers mobilize voters for personally connected candidates. We argue that politicians reward religious leaders by distributing rewards that increase their status within the organization and the local community. We illustrate this argument by investigating exchanges between Catholic bishops and Christian Democratic politicians in postwar Italy. Difference-in-differences estimates indicate that elected politicians reward connected bishops with investments in church renovations, and that electoral incentives drive these effects. These findings illustrate the reciprocal incentives that underpin politician-clergy alliances in electoral democracies.