Electoral Dynamics of Constitutional Hardball: Combating Democratic Erosion Under Compromise Penalty

Scholars have increasingly studied how to reduce support for anti-democratic acts, such as constitutional hardball (legal tactics that violate democratic norms for political advantage). This project looks at how voters respond when partisan elites attempt to police their own side’s use of hardball and whether elites are actually incentivized to do so. In multiple experimental studies, I show that cues from party leaders are able to reduce partisans’ support for hardball but that this incurs electoral costs. Voters seem to penalize politicians who forgo hardball and compromise with the out-party, becoming less likely to vote or engage in supportive acts. The close margins of recent U.S. elections make these losses more impactful, especially as they are not offset by any gains from out-party voters. If anything, out-party voters become more mobilized and politically active. This compromise penalty has important implications for how to best counter democratic-backsliding, both in the U.S. and abroad. In a highly polarized environment, it may be more effective to pursue pro -democratic hardball rather than trying to build a cross-ideological or multi-party bulwark against anti-democratic forces.