The behavioural evolution of Battery Reverse Supply Chain of New Energy Vehicle under government subsidy

With the number of energy vehicles increases, so does the quantity of used batteries. However, the stakeholders of the new energy battery supply chain, so far, have not been able to take responsibility for recycling. In this study, the influence of different subsidy strategies adopted by the government on the determination of each participant in the new energy battery supply chain is determined in the case of government participation and anarchy participation. We observed different strategies for government involvement, such as government recycling subsidies, profit reward and punishment policies, and total recovery costs and profits. At the same time, we designed a game strategy. This strategy shows that in the case of interaction between recyclers and manufacturers, the higher the additional income of recyclers and the degree of cooperation of manufacturers to participate in recycling processing, the higher the compensation for non-partners, and the recyclers and manufacturers are more inclined to increase the level of recycling. Compared with no subsidies and no government participation, government participation can improve the recycling rate of used batteries and the profits of enterprises. Our work provides decision support for government involvement in the energy vehicle supply chain.