Game Analysis of Cross-Border Electric Vehicle Supply Chain Considering Government Subsidies and Different Transportation Modes

This paper investigates the coordination between logistics and policy decisions for electric vehicle exports under the Belt and Road Initiative. Focusing on the two modes—maritime shipping and the China Railway Express (CR Express), along with government production subsidies, import tariffs, and service premium, a Stackelberg game model for a cross-border supply chain comprising a domestic manufacturer and an overseas retailer is constructed. The equilibrium outcomes under four scenarios formed by combining subsidy policies and transportation modes (Models NM, NR, GM and GR) are compared through theoretical and numerical analysis. Results show that the CR Express mode exhibits a service-driven nonlinear cost pattern, where its service premium amplifies positive market responses. Its appeal to the manufacturer, however, is tightly constrained by fixed cost. Furthermore, government subsidies can overcome this barrier by synergizing with the service premium, turning the CR Express into a relatively advantageous strategy. Moreover, subsidy efficacy is conditional, de-pending heavily on the service premium level and logistics cost coefficient, leading to a proposed differentiated subsidy framework. This study offers a theoretical basis for corporate logistics strategy and targeted policy design.