Electoral Competition with Targeted Voting Costs

How do voting laws impact elections? We highlight how laws targeting a specific group of citizens can have weak effects on turnout and vote shares but substantial effects on policy platforms, thereby influencing substantive representation even if there are no observable effects on participation. To parse these effects, we analyze a model of electoral competition with endogenous turnout and targeted voting costs. Each party anticipates the direct effect of raising one side's voting costs: discouraging targeted citizens from voting. Consequently, both platforms shift towards the untargeted group. These platform adjustments mobilize targeted citizens and demobilize the untargeted, muting the net impact on turnout and vote shares—consistent with empirical evidence for small electoral effects. Policy effects, however, hurt targeted citizens and their aligned party. The targeted group's size amplifies these effects. Our results address party competition, participation, representation, and normative and empirical evaluations of voting laws.