No Such Thing as Emotion or Affect: Conceptual Flaws and the Clinical and Social Costs of Affective Frameworks

Despite the diversity in conceptualizations of emotion and affect, frameworks that rely on such affective constructs are anchored in one or both of two foundational concepts: (a) valence as a guiding principle for behavior and a property of conscious experience, and (b) patterned sets of responses that enable complex adaptive behaviors. On rigorous examination, these concepts can be found to be entangled in fallacies, lack precision and parsimony, and offer no added explanatory power. They hinder our ability to organize and apply knowledge, perpetuating problematic assumptions that sustain each other and shape clinical and research practice. Processes seen as “emotional” can be better understood and controlled—without the need for novel constructs or theories—if concepts of valence, affect, and emotion are dismantled in scientific and clinical contexts. Viewing human (or animal) behavior and subjective experience through the lens of affective frameworks not only obscures meaningful research directions, but also leads to ineffective and potentially iatrogenic treatment of mental disorders. This is because: (a) a singular abstract construct, such as an “emotion state”—believed to tie a set of responses together—becomes the focus of study, rather than individual responses themselves, and the changing, contextual relationships between them; (b) A subjective perception of pleasure/displeasure is seen as psychologically irreducible, and as a biologically based report and directive for behavior; and (c) ingrained ideas—whether favorable or unfavorable—regarding emotions serve as unnecessary constraints, introducing ambiguities and limiting potential for health and functioning in both community and clinical settings. Keywords: emotion, affect, conceptual critique, fallacies in psychology, mental health treatments