The Role of Dispositional Intuitive versus Deliberative Thinking in Classic Heuristics and Biases

Despite extensive evidence for systematic judgment biases, particularly those associated with anchoring, availability, and representativeness, relatively little is known about the role of stable individual differences in bias susceptibility. Whereas general cognitive ability explains only a modest share of variance in bias performance, cognitive reflection has been shown to predict heuristics-and-biases outcomes more consistently. Building on this insight, the present research examined whether cognitive thinking style and trait self-control, additional constructs conceptually related to deliberative versus intuitive processing, are associated with performance on classic judgment-bias tasks. Across two complementary large-scale studies, we simultaneously examined two measures of cognitive reflection (a composite CRT combining the original three-item version and a four-item extension, and a non-numerical alternative CRT), rational and experiential thinking styles, and trait self-control. Study 1 (N = 1,071) integrated data from ten independent student cohorts (including three preregistered) that were collected over nearly a decade, whereas Study 2 (N = 480) employed a preregistered design with a heterogeneous online sample and multiple tasks per heuristic, including both externally provided and self-generated anchors. Across studies, cognitive reflection, particularly the composite CRT, emerged as the most consistent predictor of performance, predicting greater accuracy in availability and representativeness tasks and greater adjustment from self-generated anchors. These associations were observed despite minimal correlations among the bias measures themselves. In contrast, self-reported thinking style and trait self-control showed weak or null associations. We discuss the implications of these findings for traditional and revised dual-process perspectives on judgment and decision-making.