Mental agency, phenomenology, and irruption theory: Ingredients for an integrated first- and third-person investigation of free will

It is the aim of this chapter to introduce and delineate a research framework for exploring free will with first-person research methods and insights from the recently developed irruption theory, specifically as applied to the causal efficacy of intentional agency. We assume in this contribution that the explication of libertarian intuitions, such as the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), are required for a satisfying understanding of free will. PAP entails, among other things, that neural activities do not fully determine decision-making processes at the sub-personal level of description. Otherwise, it would be questionable whether a resulting action H can be ascribed to a person, if H is simply the wholly determined (causal) result of neural activities. These considerations indicate that, in a libertarian account, PAP is closely intertwined with the principle of ultimate authorship and responsibility. This means that from a libertarian perspective a person’s reasons – such as beliefs and desires with their distinctive mental properties and characteristic first-person phenomenology – must also play a distinctive causal role for bringing about an action H. What exactly these principles imply is, admittedly, controversial among advocates of libertarianism in the free will debate. What is clear, however, is that an interdisciplinary-oriented research framework must also be capable of productively integrating empirical methods and research results to develop a satisfying theory of free will.