Selfing without a self: The missing dimension of identification in computational accounts of selfhood

This paper explores the conceptualisation of “self” from the perspective of the active inference framework (AIF), advanced meditation and Buddhist literature. We argue that AIF accounts generally emphasise the organismic self—inference supporting agentic adaptive control—while overlooking a distinct aspect: the identified-with self—unperceived subject-creating elements of experience. On the AIF received view of the self, the persistent absence of a self entails dysfunction, in contrast with insight practices, in the context of the meditative endpoint in Buddhism called awakening or nibbana, which seek the permanent elimination of identification while leaving functional agency intact.We propose a two-dimensional articulation of the self that distinguishes between the organismic and identified-with self, and differentiates between reported temporary and persistent trait-like alterations. We examine how meditative deconstruction can temporarily attenuate hierarchically deep inference, disrupting organismic selfing, while long-term meditative development may persistently reduce or even eliminate the identified-with self, yielding a specific kind of selfless experience during ordinary perception, action and cognition–without functional disadvantage. We then take initial steps toward a synthesised AIF account of selfing, proposing that reductions in identified-with selfing unmask lower-level percepts, shorten engagement in higher-level inference, and establish upper limits on the certainty of beliefs.