Qualia and The Hard Problem: From Neural Impulse to Subjective Experience in SRSN

How do electrochemical activities in the brain transform into subjective, felt experiences? These experiences, known as Qualia, are the qualitative, felt aspects of subjective experience, such as the "redness of red" or the "pain of a prick." They appear irreducible to objective physical properties. These questions have long constituted "The Hard Problem of Consciousness," representing the explanatory gap between the physical processes of the brain and conscious subjective experience.In this chapter, we will reframe this problem by linking it to the Semantic Regulatory Symbolic Network (SRSN), a model developed and explained in comprehensive detail in a previous study (Alhussain, 2025). SRSN is not a specific anatomical structure or a standalone algorithm; rather, it is a proposed conceptual framework and functional model that describes how multiple neural regions within the brain organize, communicate, and interact. This model posits that SRSN is responsible for processing and interpreting incoming electrochemical signals, reforming them into meaningful cognitive symbols and felt experiences (qualia), and subsequently regulating behavior and adaptation based on these interpretations.This model suggests that feeling (qualia) is a symbolic cognitive representation essential for survival, contributing to the emergence of consciousness, free will, and decision-making. We will demonstrate how experiences are electrochemically formulated into qualia, and how these qualia act as a vital archiving tool that supports the construction of the narrative self, imbuing experiences with existential significance. We will argue that consciousness is not merely a cognitive luxury but an utmost evolutionary necessity. Ultimately, we will conclude that the question "Why does it feel?" does not possess a single objective answer describable to everyone; instead, it is a subjective experience to be felt, not answered, thus forming a new perspective that denies the traditional formulation of the question itself