Differences in Cooperation and Reputation Formation in Heterogeneous and Homogeneous Groups in Public Goods Dilemmas

Group heterogeneity is often thought to hinder cooperation and public goods provision,but it’s unclear which differences matter most or if all diversity reduces cooperation.This study examines whether two core mechanisms of cooperation—reputation andreciprocity—operate differently in groups with varying gender, race, and agecompositions. Across three studies (N = 875) using the Public Goods Game, weindependently assessed how group diversity affects reputation and reciprocity incooperative settings. Contrary to expectations, group composition (heterogeneous vshomogeneous) did not significantly alter reputation perceptions. While reciprocitydifferences emerged, they were due to varying leniency towards non-cooperatorsrather than a clear in-group bias, except in race, where White participants showedgreater cooperation with similar cooperative partners over Black ones. Our findingssuggest that, while similarity may influence initial group dynamics, its impact onreputation and cooperation wanes over time, challenging the view that diversityconsistently reduces public goods provision.