The Power of Rules: Steering Cooperative Behavior in Asymmetric Social Dilemma

Can and how rule regulate cooperative behavior in asymmetric setting is an interesting question to address.This study conducted one experiment to explore the impact of rule types on cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas.This experiment adopted a 3 (rule types: proportional/equal/no rule) × 3 (endowments: low/medium/high endowment) between-subjects design. The results showed a significant interaction between rule types and endowments. Specifically, high-endowments individuals' cooperation under the proportional rule was significantly lower than under the equal and no rule conditions. There was no significant difference in cooperation under the equal rule and no rule conditions for low-endowment and medium-endowment individuals.Moreover, high-endowment individuals tended to follow the proportional rule, while low-endowment individuals leaned more towards the equal rule.This study provides new evidence for a deeper exploration of different rule types in asymmetric social dilemmas as well as new evidence for the appropriateness framework model.