The state and status of theory in psychological science
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This article is not in any list yet, why not save it to one of your lists.Abstract
Psychology’s theory problem, long noted since Meehl, persists: most theories are verbal, underspecified, and make weak predictions, so hypotheses rarely follow from theory and findings seldom constrain it. Historical empiricism and today’s incentives (novelty, significance, volume) favor flexible, low-risk, strategically vague theorizing, while reforms and training emphasize methods over theory construction and formal/computational modeling. The result is fragmented subfields, drifting constructs, and “effects” that don’t cumulate—fueling replication failures, post-hoc rationalization, and shallow applied progress. Improving epistemic design requires educating and rewarding precise, falsifiable theories.
