Panel Study of Russian Public Opinion and Attitudes (PROPA) Wave 3

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Abstract

Between August and November 2024, Russian public sentiment was shaped by several major developments: the Ukrainian military’s successful incursion into the Kursk region, regional elections in Russia, heightened expectations for the U.S. presidential race, and rising inflation. The third wave of the Panel Study of Russian Public Opinion and Attitudes (PROPA), conducted from November to December 2024, captures how these events have influenced Russian public opinion.The study involved 3,447 online respondents, with 461 panelists participating in both the second and third waves, and an additional 1,598 respondents surveyed via telephone using the Random Digit Dialing (RDD) method. While online respondents skew toward more educated and urban populations, the telephone survey provides a broader representation of the Russian public.Key FindingsEconomic Perceptions: Concern over inflation has increased, with 81% of respondents expressing anxiety about rising prices. However, personal economic satisfaction remains stable, and those with higher incomes continue to exhibit greater support for the government. The long-term sustainability of the Russian economy remains uncertain as military expenditures rise.Perceptions of the War in Ukraine: There is a gradual decline in open support for the war, with more respondents shifting to neutral or uncertain positions. 48% openly support the war, 19% oppose it, while 32% either refuse to answer or say they do not know. Notably, Moscow residents and those less satisfied with their economic situation are more likely to move away from pro-war stances.Political Attitudes: Trust in state media remains high (57%), while independent media face credibility challenges. Political interest and discussion have slightly increased, suggesting that public engagement has not entirely faded despite restrictions. Support for Vladimir Putin remains strong but is accompanied by growing dissatisfaction with the government’s handling of economic issues.Electoral Perceptions: Although 68% of respondents were aware of the September 2024 regional elections, perceptions of electoral fraud remain prevalent. While Russians disapprove of vote-rigging and the removal of observers, many accept administrative mobilization (pressure to vote) as part of the system.Expectations for the Future: Optimism about the economy and a potential end to the war is widespread, despite objective challenges. 47% believe the war will end within a year, while 70% expect economic growth. However, opposition-minded respondents are more likely to anticipate rising crime and new waves of military mobilization.While economic concerns and shifting perceptions of the war are emerging, overall support for the status quo remains resilient, driven by propaganda narratives and economic dependencies. However, declining trust in government institutions and increased uncertainty about the war suggest that cracks in public confidence may deepen if economic or military conditions worsen.

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