Integrating Evolutionary Game Theory with Empirical Models to Understand Trust and Cooperation in Human Social Dynamics

Purpose: Trust and cooperation are central to the functioning of social and institutional systems. While evolutionary game theory (EGT) provides formal models for studying cooperative behavior, many such models rely on simplified assumptions that limit their ability to reflect empirically observed variation across social, institutional, and cultural contexts. Empirical research, in contrast, documents substantial heterogeneity in cooperative behavior but often lacks a formal dynamic framework. The purpose of this study is to examine how evolutionary game-theoretic models can be empirically informed and constrained to better capture observed patterns of trust and cooperation in human societies. Method: The study employs a computational–empirical hybrid approach combining evolutionary game theory and agent-based modeling with secondary empirical data. Agent-based simulations were implemented to model cooperation dynamics under varying network structures, institutional mechanisms, and cultural conditions. Empirical data from laboratory experiments, online cooperation studies, and large-scale cross-cultural surveys (including the World Values Survey and the Global Preferences Survey) were used to parameterize model assumptions and validate simulation outputs, rather than to establish causal effects. Statistical analyses were conducted to assess the alignment between simulated outcomes and empirical trust indicators. Results: Simulation results indicate that cooperation is more stable in structured interaction networks when supported by reputation mechanisms, compared to disordered populations. Institutional enforcement and reputation systems jointly enhance cooperative stability, exhibiting non-linear threshold effects. Cross-cultural comparisons show that simulated cooperation levels correspond closely with empirical trust measures, suggesting that institutional quality and cultural norms condition cooperative dynamics within the modeled framework. Conclusion: The findings suggest that empirically informed evolutionary models can offer a more context-sensitive representation of cooperation without claiming direct causal inference from observational data. By positioning empirical evidence as a source of calibration and validation, rather than explanation, this study advances a cautious and methodologically grounded approach to integrating evolutionary game theory with real-world behavioral patterns. The results highlight the importance of combining institutional mechanisms, network structure, and cultural context when modeling cooperation in complex social systems.