Axiological Cluelessness

Many authors argue that astronomical gains lie in attempting to prevent human extinction, often assuming that the long-term future has net positive value on average. However, I argue that we appear to face axiological cluelessness: significant or complete ignorance about the long-term future’s net value. Then, I examine how robust the case for existential risk reduction is to this ignorance. I find that a strong form of axiological cluelessness makes existential risk reduction less cost-effective than certain global health charities, indicating that the case for reducing existential risk is sensitive to the extent of our uncertainty about the long-term future’s net value. Exploring a weak form of axiological cluelessness indicates that the expected value of existential risk reduction is also sensitive to the expected future population. Finally, I examine the implications of these considerations on longtermism and interventions seeking to improve the long-term future other than existential risk reduction.