Assessing the risk of cascading COVID-19 outbreaks from prison-to-prison transfers
This article has been Reviewed by the following groups
Discuss this preprint
Start a discussion What are Sciety discussions?Listed in
- Evaluated articles (ScreenIT)
Abstract
Article activity feed
-
-
SciScore for 10.1101/2021.04.12.21255363: (What is this?)
Please note, not all rigor criteria are appropriate for all manuscripts.
Table 1: Rigor
Ethics not detected. Sex as a biological variable not detected. Randomization not detected. Blinding not detected. Power Analysis not detected. Table 2: Resources
No key resources detected.
Results from OddPub: We did not detect open data. We also did not detect open code. Researchers are encouraged to share open data when possible (see Nature blog).
Results from LimitationRecognizer: We detected the following sentences addressing limitations in the study:These results have a number of limitations. We have assumed that individuals are removed from the epidemic process at the end of their infective period, as we consider the final size of each local epidemic, and thus do not account for the possibility of …
SciScore for 10.1101/2021.04.12.21255363: (What is this?)
Please note, not all rigor criteria are appropriate for all manuscripts.
Table 1: Rigor
Ethics not detected. Sex as a biological variable not detected. Randomization not detected. Blinding not detected. Power Analysis not detected. Table 2: Resources
No key resources detected.
Results from OddPub: We did not detect open data. We also did not detect open code. Researchers are encouraged to share open data when possible (see Nature blog).
Results from LimitationRecognizer: We detected the following sentences addressing limitations in the study:These results have a number of limitations. We have assumed that individuals are removed from the epidemic process at the end of their infective period, as we consider the final size of each local epidemic, and thus do not account for the possibility of reinfection. In using a branching process, we have implicitly assumed a very large number of local communities, so that at least initially, each global transmission is to a new site, and ignores the possibility of a second epidemic in the same location. This assumption is reasonable in the context of prisons, where there are indeed many sites. The assumption of a homogeneous rate of transfer per individual across all prisons may be limiting as heterogeneity may be important. This approach is applicable to analysis of risk due to transmission between sites in a variety of hotspot settings of transmission including but not limited to prisons. Transfer, migration, and mixing between sites may be important sources of risk in other locations of high transmission as well, such as jails, ICE facilities, skilled nursing care facilities, meat packing plants, and other agricultural operations.
Results from TrialIdentifier: No clinical trial numbers were referenced.
Results from Barzooka: We did not find any issues relating to the usage of bar graphs.
Results from JetFighter: We did not find any issues relating to colormaps.
Results from rtransparent:- Thank you for including a conflict of interest statement. Authors are encouraged to include this statement when submitting to a journal.
- Thank you for including a funding statement. Authors are encouraged to include this statement when submitting to a journal.
- Thank you for including a protocol registration statement.
-
