Evolution of the division of labor between two interacting public tasks

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Abstract

Individuals in many species perform several costly tasks whose benefits are shared with neighbors: bacteria secrete distinct public metabolites, plants emit distinct defensive volatiles, and human foragers acquire distinct shared foods. Performing one of these tasks often changes the benefits and costs of the other: a forager who brings in one kind of food provides different nutritional benefits to neighbors than one who brings in several kinds, and the difference depends on what the neighbors bring. Here we ask which divisions of labor evolve when two tasks interact. We model the interaction at both the group and the individual level, and we derive the long-run outcomes of the replicator dynamics as functions of the task payoffs and the interaction parameters. Interactions between tasks produce long-run outcomes that cannot occur when the tasks are independent. In particular, specialists, who perform one task but not the other, can coexist in a stable division of labor only if the tasks interact, and in most cases only if the interaction is more favorable when different individuals perform the two tasks than when one individual performs both. We also show that a specialized division of labor can be bistable with a non-specialized one, and we prove that, when both tasks are identical anti-coordination games, individuals in the specialized population have higher fitness. This bistability produces hysteresis in both the division of labor and fitness as interaction parameters vary. Populations with identical payoffs can therefore evolve to divisions of labor with different mean fitness.

Non-specialist summary

Many organisms perform several costly tasks whose products are shared with neighbors: bacteria secrete molecules used by other cells, and human foragers share the different foods they collect. The value of one task often depends on whether the other is also performed, and on whether one individual performs both or two perform one each. We model evolution mathematically to ask how such interactions determine who performs which task. Individuals that each perform one task coexist only when the tasks interact, and usually only when two individuals who split the tasks gain more from their interaction than one individual who performs both. A population can evolve to either of two divisions of labor with different mean fitness, depending on its initial composition.

Article activity feed

  1. Evolution of the division of labor between two interacting public tasks https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.10.13.758955v1

  2. Evolution of the division of labor between two interacting public tasks https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.10.13.758955v1