Limitations of cross-border containment strategies for Bundibugyo ebolavirus
Discuss this preprint
Start a discussion What are Sciety discussions?Listed in
This article is not in any list yet, why not save it to one of your lists.Abstract
An ongoing outbreak of Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was deemed a public health emergency of international concern in May 2026. To prevent cross-border importation, many countries, including the United States, Canada, India, Thailand, and Kenya have already proposed containment strategies, and others are likely to follow suit. How well (or poorly) are screening and quarantine containment measures are likely to work? We leverage established epidemiological theory and develop a mathematical model of traveler screening and post-arrival quarantine for BVD to answer this question. We find that traveler screening via symptom screening or molecular testing will miss the majority of infected travelers, and should be complemented by post-arrival quarantine and monitoring of sufficient duration to detect those with long incubation periods. Our findings underscore the limitations of border screening and the importance of complementary measures like post-arrival quarantine to prevent local importation of BVD.
