Reconceptualizing Consciousness: Towards an Expanded Scientific Paradigm

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Abstract

The profound challenge of phenomenal consciousness—the subjective "what it's like" to experience—persists as a central enigma in modern science. While neuroscience meticulously identifies neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs), this essay contends that such findings may represent proximate manifestations rather than the fundamental nature of consciousness itself. Drawing a parallel with historical paradigm shifts, we argue that current scientific explanations might be inherently limited by their foundational assumptions and methodologies. The core critique centers on the "subset problem": if consciousness is a superset encompassing brain structures, then attempting to define its totality solely through brain mechanisms (a subset) is intrinsically constrained. Scientific instruments, designed for the physical realm, prove inadequate for phenomena potentially transcending material dimensions, suggesting the existence of "rules beyond the brain." Given science's acceptance of abstract fundamentals like information and mathematical structures—entities not reducible to physical objects—consciousness could similarly be a primary, abstract constituent of reality. This renders the "hard problem" a consequence of applying subset-oriented tools to a superset phenomenon. Furthermore, cosmological observations hinting at universal interconnectedness and singularities where physics breaks down suggest a deeper, unifying entity, whose intrinsic principles are not fully explicable by current physical theories. Analogous to inferring a black hole's nature from its effects despite its unobservable interior, consciousness's intrinsic subjectivity remains inaccessible to physical measurement. Ultimately, while science provides invaluable models for brain function, its existing framework may be fundamentally insufficient to fully elucidate the deepest nature of subjective experience, thereby necessitating a broader conceptual paradigm.

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