Anticipated Discrimination and Wage Negotiation: A Field Experiment

This paper proposes a field experiment to study whether potential anticipation of gender discrimination affects requested wages. People interested in an advertised position can apply using an online portal. After the initial application, participants are randomly allocated to one of three treatments. In the baseline treatment, applicants are asked to fill in a standardized curriculum vitae template, containing information about the applicant’s first name, surname, age, education, and employment. In a gender-blind treatment, applicants complete a curriculum vitae template in which they can only report their initials, so that information about gender is not transmitted. We also conduct a gender-blind treatment in which applicants receive a message emphasizing that the selection is conducted based on merits. In all treatments, applicants request the hourly wage they wish to receive if hired. We find that female applicants ask for just over half the wage requested by male applicants when the full name is revealed. However, when gender is undisclosed this difference in requests decreases by over 50%. Finally, the reinforcing message (third treatment) causes the gap in requested wages to completely disappear. Our results indicate that female workers request much lower wages when the firm clearly knows the applicant’s gender, but that this lower request is dependent on whether they perceive that one’s gender is known to the hiring firm.