How Conflict Aversion Can Enable Authoritarianism: An Evolutionary Dynamics Approach

We use evolutionary game theory to examine how conflict-averse centrism can facilitate authoritarian success in polarized political conflicts. Such conflicts are often asymmetric: authoritarian actors can employ norm-breaking or coercive tactics, while democratic resistance faces stronger normative constraints on acceptable behavior. Yet formal models typically treat sides symmetrically and rarely examine conflict-averse behavior. Drawing on empirical research on protest backlash, civility norms, and authoritarian resilience, we model these dynamics as a three-strategy evolutionary game. This framework yields two outcomes—cyclic authoritarian resurgence through a heteroclinic cycle and a stable centrist–authoritarian coalition excluding resistance—depending on confrontation responses. We demonstrate how an established dynamical framework with empirically grounded behavioral assumptions clarifies conditions under which conflict aversion can diminish the effectiveness of democratic resistance.