Ceasing fire or fighting on? Insurgent violence, ideology and negotiations

This article sheds light on dynamics of pacification and how they can be affected by insurgent extremity and violence against civilians. While previous research suggests that (civilian) deaths shape the probability of negotiations, it shows that the effect can take two directions. As increasing death tolls mean higher conflict costs, they can lower the probability of negotiations. At the same time, civilian killings may increase the conflict’s intractability and decrease trust between the parties, thus lowering the probability of negotiations. I argue that the direction of the effect of civilian targeting depends on insurgent ideology. When the insurgents’ extremity is low, they can use civilian targeting to exert power and pressure the government into negotiations. When their extremity is high, civilian targeting is more likely to have the opposite effect: Killing civilians can lower trust in the insurgents and entrench cleavages in society. Apart from this moderated effect via civilian killings, I also expect extremity to have a direct effect on the probability of conflict parties entering into meaningful negotiations. As high extremity increases both commitment and indivisibility problems, insurgents are less likely to meaningfully negotiate with increasing extremity. These expectations are supported by an analysis conducted using data on insurgent ideologies in civil wars between 1990 and 2020.