Malapportionment as a Gerrymandering Strategy: Exploring Electoral Manipulation in Malaysia Using a Simulation Algorithm

Gerrymandering and malapportionment both undermine fair representation and involve electoral district boundaries. However, existing research has treated these phenomena separately, leading to disconnected bodies of literature. This paper demonstrates that malapportionment can be used as an instrument of gerrymandering. Conventional gerrymandering tactics of cracking and packing can be more sophisticated when the district boundary drawers in power can control the district populations. We illustrate this new yet simple gerrymandering strategy using the case of Malaysia, a long-lasting electoral authoritarian regime that endured from the early 1970s to 2018, focusing on ethnic representation. By comparing the enacted districting plan with counterfactual electoral districts simulated through Sequential Monte Carlo redistricting simulation, we identify significant ethnic gerrymandering against the minority Chinese Malaysians, in which cracking and packing are the strategies adopted by the majority Malay-dominated ruling coalition.