A Pragmatist Framework for the Study of Reflective Cognition

This article advances dual-process theory (DPT) by developing a pragmatist framework for the study of reflective cognition. While dual-process models were introduced to sociology via Bourdieusian practice theory, Bourdieusian DPT has proven inadequate for theorizing reflective cognition and action, with sociologists looking to pragmatism as an alternative. To support these efforts, I provide a synthetic, elemental account of the pragmatist theory of reflection, delineating reflective cognition’s defining characteristics, core components, its relationship with non-reflective cognition, and its interindividual variation. I then outline the merits of the pragmatist theory of reflection for dual-process research, arguing that it addresses major limitations of Bourdieusian DPT, has broad interdisciplinary support, provides advantages in terms of conceptualization, operationalization, and measurement, and offers sociology a novel research agenda. Overall, I argue that pragmatism provides a robust framework to enhance the study of reflective cognition and is a valuable, if not superior, theoretical alternative for dual-process research. I conclude by discussing the implications of this framework for research on discrimination, inequality, and culture.