Policy Analysis: UK Parental Alienation Practice, Domestic-Abuse Primacy, and the Problem of Conceptual Equity: Procedure, Policy, and International Implications

The recent UK position on parental alienation (PA) is clearer in procedure than in principle. Recent guidance and family-law case law reorient the field toward a more disciplined model in which allegations of parental alienating behaviour (PAB) are treated as matters for judicial fact-finding rather than psychological diagnosis or expert-made fact. In that respect, the Re Y “modern approach” is an advance. This article argues, however, that the same framework also embeds a substantive hierarchy in which domestic abuse (DA) is given conceptual, analytical, and sequencing priority, and allegations of PAB are reviewed through a DA-first lens. The article contends that Re Y is correct to reject expert substitution for fact-finding, the current scientific literature does not establish a reliable comparative basis for treating DA as the dominant causal frame, as a general rule, in mixed DA/PA cases, and the hierarchy is better understood as a statutory and safeguarding choice than as a conclusion compelled by settled comparative science. The result is a framework that is statutorily authorised and procedurally improved, but conceptually incomplete and analytically contestable. The article concludes by considering the implications of this position for current UK practice and for the international uptake of UK family-law models.