Stoicism, mindfulness, and the empirical foundations of second-order desires

Starting with the Stoics’ notion of self-regulation, we discuss philosophical conceptualizations and juxtapose them with empirical evidence from psychology and cognitive neuroscience. We disagree with a strong mainstream account that excludes the possibility of free will. We argue for a meaningful way to speak of free will largely independently of the compatibilist-libertarian debate. Contemporary empirical findings support the Stoic view of the freedom of will if one focuses on diachronic self-regulation over time and second-order willed actions. As evidence clearly challenges the classical interpretation of Libet-type experiments, which supposedly refute the notion of free will, we opt for the notion of ‘relative free will’. Far from being passive recipients of constantly upcoming desires, we can proactively self-regulate what we actually want to do through controlled voluntary intentions. We as humans are free in the sense that the capacity of self-regulation is a meta-cognitive ability or second-order will which is causally effective in enforcing and inhibiting first-order desires (impulsive habits). Our choices are not causally dependent on upbringing and circumstances; they are a product of the reflection concerning our upbringing and the circumstances. The self constantly intervenes between alleged causes and effects and thus becomes a self-determined free agent.