The perceived role of consciousness in moral status attributions

Determining the grounds for moral status attributions is important for policy-making, especially regarding animal welfare and AI regulation. We tested the common claim that consciousness is key for such attributions. Across 1,493 respondents (793 confirmatory sample), we surveyed whether consciousness is considered necessary and/or sufficient for moral status, and whether its contribution can be distinguished from valence and cognition. We triangulated moral dilemmas, attribution questions, and direct questions about the relationship between consciousness and moral status. Contrary to many theoretical accounts, although moral status was strongly associated with consciousness attributions, consciousness was not perceived as either necessary or sufficient for moral consideration. Instead, our findings suggest that shifting the focus to the relative contribution of consciousness to moral status might be more beneficial. Integrating these insights into current discussions is important for fostering decision-making processes that are transparent, democratic, and mindful of the plurality of public attitudes.