An Ingroup Critique of Self-Categorization Theory

Self-Categorization Theory (Turner et al., 1987; 1994) has proven itself to be one of the most influential and robust explanatory theories in social psychology. Its two foundational texts have been cited almost 25,000 times and it has spurred theoretical, empirical, and applied research across a wide array of topics. Despite its successes, I will argue in this talk that a number of its theoretical and meta-theoretical commitments and the underdetermination of some of its core tenets hold it back. Specifically, I will outline 5 related issues in current statements, understandings, and/or operationalizations of the theory: (1) an overemphasis on (and sometimes conflation of) groups as categories; (2) a general ambiguity with regard to the nature of the stimuli being categorized; (3) an underappreciation of the distinction between categories and entities; (4) a relative absence of recursive embedding in conceptions of the self and of the relations between self and other; and (5) the implausibility (and perhaps the computational intractability) of meta-contrast as a basis for category differentiation. I will conclude the talk with a discussion of ways in which these challenges can be addressed, with the goal of strengthening Self-Categorization Theory and extending its scope into the future.