Systemic Abdication in Danish Child Services Subtitle: How Structural Incentives Undermine Custody, Visitation, and Child Welfare

Although Denmark is internationally recognized for its progressive welfare state, this paper uncovers how structural incentives within its decentralized child welfare system foster institutional inaction, even in cases involving serious risks to children. Contrary to public perception, municipal child services frequently fail to enforce rulings related to custody, visitation (samvær), and child support (børnebidrag), not due to resource scarcity or isolated errors, but because of embedded bureaucratic incentives that discourage intervention. Jurisdictional confusion, cost-avoidance behaviors, and a lack of binding enforcement mechanisms collectively undermine the rights and safety of vulnerable children. Through legal analysis, audit data, and anonymized case studies, this paper shows how institutional self-protection and administrative fragmentation erode the rule of law and violate basic human rights. It argues that Denmark’s child protection failures are not exceptions—but predictable outcomes of a system designed to distribute responsibility without accountability.