Self-Categorization Theory 2.0: An (Ingroup) Critique, Refinement, and Expansion of Self-Categorization Theory

In this paper, I present 5 critiques of Self-Categorization Theory: (1) categorization into equivalence classes is neither sufficient nor necessary for perceiving groups as entities; (2) the boundary conditions on self-categorization (vs. categorization) are underspecified; (3) the person level is relatively underexamined; (4) meta-contrast is implausible as a basis for entity formation; and (5) comparative and correlational relations are overemphasized. I propose as resolutions to these critiques that: self-categorization is the categorization of intentional agents; persons and groups are holistic entities, perceptually triggered by cues to individual or collective intentionality, and cognitively represented as “conceptual atoms” with an associated object file; group phenomena have person equivalents and vice-versa; and relations between intentional entities and between intentional entities and their properties are represented propositionally in a “language of thought”. Taken together these resolutions result in an updated Self-Categorization Theory 2.0 (SCT2.0). I discuss this expanded theory in general terms, and then go into greater detail about the key mechanisms of salience, depersonalization, and prototypicality. I conclude with a brief discussion of the way in which SCT2.0 builds on the legacy of its predecessor.