Misinformation Distorts Perceived Social Consensus, and Interventions Help Correct It

Misinformation exposure is widely known to affect individuals’ own judgements. Here, we demonstrate that exposure to misinformation also has social consequences which have been largely overlooked. Across multiple experiments (total N=6,273 Americans), we extend the study of misinformation from studying what people believe themselves (first-order beliefs) to also examining what people believe about what others believe (second-order beliefs). Given the substantial evidence that second-order beliefs play a central role in social coordination, collective action, and trust in institutions, understanding the relationship between misinformation and second-order beliefs—while largely overlooked—is of great importance. First, we demonstrate that the illusory truth effect extends to second-order beliefs: exposure to false content increases participants' belief that others believe the claim just as much as it increases their own belief in the claim. Second, we find that individuals tend to overestimate how widely false statements—but not true claims—are believed by others, indicating miscalibrated meta-perceptions. Third, we show that common interventions designed to reduce first-order belief to misinformation— media literacy tips and descriptive norms—also reduce second-order beliefs to a similar extent. By demonstrating that misinformation alters not only private belief but also perceived social consensus, we uncover second-order belief distortion as a critical mechanism through which falsehoods influence societies; and by demonstrating that anti-misinformation interventions also reduce second-order belief in false claims, we reveal a previously underappreciated channel through which such intervention strategies exert social benefits.