Beliefs about Characteristics Of Relative Essence (CORE Beliefs): A Theory to Unify Disparate Belief Literatures

The insight that our beliefs are not mere reactions to our experiences but also a cause of our experiences is central to most disciplines in psychology. Yet research progress has been slowed by ambiguous definition, classification, and measurement of beliefs. Drawing from Beck’s original work on “core beliefs” and integrating previously disparate literatures including appraisals, mindsets, and primals, we present an integrated, technical definition of CORE beliefs as beliefs about the Characteristics of Relative Essence of a topic in which the modifier ascribed to that topic is adjectival, simple, and evaluative (e.g., the world is dangerous; I am incompetent; stress is enhancing; my body is capable). By focusing on modifiers rather than topic, our theory aids field organization, hypothesis generation, accelerated cumulative science, and increased precision in belief intervention. In the future, we hope that all psychological researchers, no matter one’s subdiscipline or outcome of interest, can contribute to a single, cumulative science of beliefs. The notion—that beliefs are not merely reactions to our experience but a cause of it—deserves a matured science equal to the task.