Of Hidden Springs and Endless Oceans

Read the full article See related articles

Listed in

This article is not in any list yet, why not save it to one of your lists.
Log in to save this article

Abstract

In the wake of the active inference framework, two popular theories of consciousness high-light the relevance of insular cortex for interoceptive self-modeling (Fermin et al., 2022; Seth, 2021) and subcortical brain regions for qualitative experience (Solms, 2021). Both provide a compelling ecological argument for integrated conscious experience, i.e., self-organization of complex organisms with optimization goals that are usually parallel, multifaceted, and hard to reconcile. Computationally, both theories require some kind of self-model as basis, which could contradict credible reports of minimal phenomenal experience (MPE) (Metzinger, 2024). However, duality of conscious experience could be explained by a neuroscientific theo-ry of two distinct brain networks emerging from different neurodevelopmental pathways, leading to marked differences in cytoarchitecture and function (Luu et al., 2024; Sanides, 1962). System-A, originating from an olfactory system and amygdala-centered expansion gradient towards ventral cortex, could enable interoceptive self-modeling for habitual interac-tions with the body and the world. System-H, hippocampus-centered towards dorsal cortex, could enable less egocentric forms of cognition and experience. In this sense, MPE could be a less salient/habitual form of experience, when neither interoceptive/exteroceptive prediction errors nor spontaneous episodic memory reactivation provide self-referential engagement of System-A. System-H, if not operating on content, could give rise to self-less experience of the world as such.

Article activity feed