Dispelling the Myth of Moral Inversion: Liberals Show More Universalism in the Moral Circle Without Diminishing Concern for Close Others

Do ideological differences in moral concern reflect competing priorities, or do liberals simply extend moral concern more broadly without sacrificing care for close others? Across two large-scale reanalyses, we test the claim that liberal moral universalism comes at the expense of concern for close relationships. First, we analyze a nationally representative sample of U.S. adults (N = 1,000). Second, we reanalyze data from four large online convenience samples (N = 3,201; Prolific). Using the Moral Expansiveness Scale (MES), we examine how ideology shapes moral circles and whether concern for distant others competes with—or coexists alongside—care for those nearby. Across all samples, concern for distant others positively correlates with concern for close others. Liberals tend to show more expansive moral concern without diminishing concern for close relationships. Ingroup favoritism remains consistent across ideologies, but very conservative individuals in the representative sample showed no difference between their concern for ingroups and outgroups—driven not by greater outgroup concern, but lower concern for close others. These findings challenge the idea that liberals neglect their inner circles and instead suggest ideological differences reflect how far moral concern extends outward. Our results carry implications for understanding moral priorities in increasingly polarized political discourse.