Dispelling the Myth of Moral Inversion: Liberals and Conservatives Show Similar Patterns of Moral Expansiveness

Do ideological differences in moral concern reflect a true reversal of ethical priorities, or do liberals simply extend moral concern more broadly without compromising their commitment to close relationships? Across two large-scale reanalyses, we test the claim that liberal moral universalism comes at the expense of concern for close others. First, we analyze a nationally representative sample of U.S. adults (N = 1,000) weighted to match census benchmarks. Second, we conduct an integrative reanalysis of four large online convenience samples (N = 3,201; Prolific). Using the Moral Expansiveness Scale (MES), a widely used measure of moral concern, we examine how ideology shapes moral circles and whether concern for distant others competes with––or coexists alongside––care for those closer to home. Results show that greater concern for distant entities, including outgroups and non-human entities, positively correlates with concern for close others rather than displacing it. Moreover, across the ideological spectrum, ingroup favoritism remains a strong and consistent pattern. However, very conservative individuals in the representative sample showed no meaningful difference between their moral concern for ingroups and outgroups, driven not by heightened outgroup concern but by lower concern for close others. These findings challenge the notion that liberals neglect their immediate social circles and instead suggest that ideological differences in moral expansiveness stem from the degree to which concern extends outward. Our results have important implications for understanding how ideological worldviews shape moral priorities, particularly in a political climate where moral concern is often framed in zero-sum terms.