Aesthetic Emotions are Epistemic Emotions

In this paper, I argue that aesthetic emotions are epistemic emotions. This claim helps resolve an apparent contradiction that relates to the concept of aesthetic disinterestedness. On the one hand, disinterestedness—being free from desires, practical concerns, or intense motivational involvement—is often regarded as central to aesthetic experience and appreciation. On the other hand, we nonetheless engage with artworks with a strong drive to explore them, by developing attachments or by emotionally impactful emotional episodes. I will argue for a distinct way to navigate this tension: Disinterestedness is not a phenomenal property of an aesthetic attitude or pleasure. It rather concerns at what an aesthetic emotion is directed—its formal object. This object is not a pressing material or social concern, but rather cognition itself. It is in this sense that disinterestedness can be understood as central to aesthetic emotions, which, so my argument will go, are also epistemic emotions.To substantiate the philosophical argument, I will discuss central features of emotions and draw on Kant’s theory of fine art, before relating this to experimental work on art engagement in a Philosophically guided supplementary Analysis (PgsA) of existing studies. The results indicate that emotions which reliably track artistic value are also associated with enhanced cognitive processing, reflection, and experiences of insight. More specifically, the data are consistent with the wonder hypothesis, according to which the emotion of wonder may play a central role in tracking artistic goodness. More broadly, the paper outlines an Affective Aesthetic Cognitivism that comprises emotions, cognitive expansion, and artistic value as core elements in theorizing about the transformative potential of art. Keywords Aesthetic emotion; Epistemic emotion; Aesthetic cognitivism; Disinterestedness; Wonder; Art and Cognition; Neuroaesthetics