People Are Not Sure What Free Will is But Sometimes Employ the Notion to Justify Punishment

This study examines the relationship between attributions of free will and intentions to punish agents. Participants were presented with vignettes depicting hypothetical yet concrete scenarios involving immoral versus either neutral, immoral-but-inconsequential, or moral actions. They were then asked to rate the degree of free will attributed to the agents and their intended level of punishment. Additionally, participants completed the Free Will and Determinism Plus (FAD+) scale, which assesses abstract beliefs —contra the concrete scenarios of the vignettes— about free will, scientific determinism, fatalistic determinism, and unpredictability. The results indicate a weak correlation between free will attributions and punishment intentions across the concrete scenarios. Specifically, participants attributed less free will to immoral actors compared to neutral actors, yet they expressed slightly greater intentions to punish immoral actors. Similarly, abstract free will beliefs measured by the FAD+ showed minimal correlation with punishment intentions across vignettes. Furthermore, the limited consistency between participants’ free will beliefs in concrete scenarios and their responses on abstract measures indicates that the concept of free will remains ambiguous. This ambiguity is further substantiated by participants’ subjective descriptions of their understanding of free will, supporting the notion that their conceptualization of free will lacks clarity.