Hard bargains and even splits: Fairness judgments track bargaining power across diverse cultures

What is the fair way to distribute resources? Past research highlights egalitarian and redistributive intuitions that favor the disadvantaged. Contractualist theories propose moral judgments mirror what rational agents would agree to, favoring parties in advantaged bargaining positions. We reconcile these views, showing people think it fair to favor the advantaged when they have more bargaining power, but to favor the disadvantaged in a non-bargaining context. Specifically, across nine countries, participants (n = 6,304) make third-party judgments about themorally best split of a fixed amount. When the split requires agreement (bilateral negotiation in Study 1; third-party negotiation in Study 2), moral judgments overwhelmingly track bargaining power and can be predicted with striking quantitative precision. When the split is determined bya unilateral donation and existing inequalities do not alter bargaining positions, moral intuitionsare reversed, reflecting redistributive or egalitarian concerns.