Perceptions of Reasonableness in Moral Disagreements: Sources and Implications

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Abstract

Some moral disagreements cause conflicts—but many do not. People who disagree about abortion, immigration, or gun rights can attack each other or have respectful conversations. One possible yet understudied contributor to respectful disagreement is perceptions of moral reasonableness: the sense that the other person has sound grounds for their moral stance. This research examined the sources and implications of moral reasonableness perceptions. Across eight studies (Total N = 811), participants perceived disagreements about hypothetical (Studies 1-2, 5-8) and political (Studies 3-4, 6-7) issues as more reasonable when issues were more difficult, be that through complexity (H1a), novelty (H1b), or informational obscurity (H1c). Participants who perceived a disagreeant as more reasonable expressed more willingness to socialize and less hostility (H2). Study 5 developed a scale for assessing perceptions of moral reasonableness. Studies 6-7 showed that people’s perceived reasonableness is not merely based on the specific moral stance but on psychological attributions about why the person holds that stance (H3). Study 8 distinguishes perceptions of moral reasonableness from general reasonableness (H4) and other constructs (H5). Our findings point to perceptions of moral reasonableness a key, underexamined factor that shapes the course of moral disagreements. Even in a polarized country, people are not doomed to demonize people they disagree with.

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