Cadre networks and bureaucratic careers in autocracies

Many autocracies employ classic Weberian bureaucratic structures with formalized recruitment systems for low-level bureaucrats. How successful are these systems in weeding out informal personal ties outside the control of the authoritarian elite? And, if low-level personal networks continue to matter, do they undermine regime interests or do they reflect regime preferences? We undertake the first empirical analysis of such networks, focusing on the case of the former German Democratic Republic. We draw on detailed biographical data on over 180,000 cadres to investigate how workplace-based cadre networks shaped promotion practices. Difference-in-differences models show that cadre networks help individuals' career trajectories. We also demonstrate that network-based promotions mirrored regime preferences, instead of contributing to decentralized cronyism. These findings help us to better understand how the persistence of informal promotion practices can aid autocrats in aligning bureaucratic apparatuses with regime interests.