Neo-Lewisian perspectives on consciousness and information

This article defends a re-interpretation of Lewis-Nemirow’s response to Jackson’s knowledge argument against physicalism. Lewis and Nemirow argue that when color-omniscient Mary learns what it is like to see colors, what she gains is a new set of abilities to visualize, recognize, and place herself in the perspective of someone who has color experiences. This view is known as the ability hypothesis, and not only has been one influential defense of physicalism but is also the view that Jackson himself came to advocate upon becoming convinced that there was something wrong with his own argument. However, the ability hypothesis must be updated to rectify some important misconceptions about the kind of abilities ascribed to Mary. We argue that these are fundamentally attentional abilities: abilities to direct her attention in new ways. Furthermore, contra the original ability hypothesis, our updated version acknowledges that learning what it is like to see colors gives Mary new information.