Bureaucracy under Authoritarian Rule: Autonomy and Resilience of Administrative Institutions in Divided Times

In order to successfully establish their new rule, authoritarian regimes that seize power through democratic elections need to find some modus of operation with the bureaucracy. How will authoritarian regimes approach the matter of securing the civil service to their cause and how will the bureaucracy respond to an authoritarian seizure of power? These questions are central in this paper that explores the strategies of authoritarian regimes after they have come to power in democratic systems. The theoretical point of reference are theories of political administrative relationships, but our explorative case study, the Nazi’s civil service politics after they seized power in Weimar Germany in 1933, also demonstrate the need to delve into adjacent theories of autonomy, civil service systems, and bureaucratic politics and competition. The paper’s main goal is to present six propositions to the problem that can guide further research on the issue of bureaucratic resilience under authoritarian rule.