When Justice Errs: Innocence, Wrongful Punishment, and the Moral Responsibility of Legal Systems

This paper examines the moral, constitutional, and systemic implications of wrongful convictions within modern criminal justice systems. It explores the tension between the state’s duty to prosecute and punish crime and its equally fundamental obligation to protect innocent individuals from unjust punishment. While contemporary legal systems are grounded in principles such as the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, wrongful convictions continue to occur due to human error, institutional bias, procedural failures, and evidentiary limitations.Through a doctrinal and comparative analysis, the paper draws upon jurisprudence from Canada, the United Kingdom, India, and the United States, as well as international human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. It further engages with key jurisprudential traditions, including natural law theory, legal positivism, and sociological jurisprudence, alongside ethical frameworks such as the concept of Dharma, to provide a broader normative understanding of justice and legal responsibility.The paper argues that wrongful conviction is not merely an exceptional failure of legal process but an inherent risk embedded within all systems of criminal adjudication. It contends that the legitimacy of criminal law depends not only on its capacity to punish wrongdoing but on its continuous moral justification in safeguarding the innocent. Ultimately, the study calls for a more ethically conscious and structurally reflective approach to criminal justice that balances legal certainty with awareness of human fallibility.