Moral Convictions Amplify the Fundamental Attribution Error

People often see political issues not just as matters of preference, but as moral truths—deeply held convictions about right and wrong. These moral convictions are thought to play a role in fueling polarization in society, yet the psychological processes through which this occurs have not been fully clarified. Across three studies (N = 1,611), we examined whether stronger moral convictions are associated with a greater tendency to commit the fundamental attribution error (FAE)—the propensity to assume someone’s behavior reflects their true character, even when situational explanations are provided. Participants read an essay taking a stance on a divisive issue, and were told the author had been randomly assigned to argue that position. We then measured dispositional inferences— that is, the extent to which participants believed the author genuinely held that view, and whether it reflected their overall character. Critically, we tested whether these judgments were related to the participant’s own moral convictions about the topic. Results from Studies 1 and 2 were mixed but broadly supportive, with effects varying across measures. In Study 3, which featured a larger, more diverse sample and improved methods, stronger moral convictions predicted increased dispositional inferences—but especially when participants agreed with the essay’s stance. These inferences were also linked to interpersonal evaluations, including warmth and moral trait attributions. An internal meta-analysis confirmed the robustness of these findings. We discuss how, when confronted by deeply moralized issues, the FAE may serve a motivated function by helping individuals maintain a coherent and morally affirming worldview.