Research on Early Warning Threshold Setting for Inventory Pledge Financing under Supervisory credit Restructuring

From the perspective of supervisory credit reconstruction, this paper proposes the setting of early warning points. By integrating evolutionary game theory, the stochastic cusp model, and escape rate theory, it begins with the game equilibrium between financial institutions and third-party logistics (3PL) enterprises, gradually incorporates stochastic disturbances, constructs a stochastic cusp model, and derives the bifurcation point set. The replenishment point is then calculated based on the difference in cargo value between the two parties. Furthermore, by applying escape rate theory, the liquidation point is determined, and simulations are conducted to examine the impact of disturbances on both the replenishment and liquidation points. The study reveals that: 1) In the absence of external factors such as fluctuations in the market price of pledged goods and the operational status of financing enterprises, the optimal equilibrium strategy for both parties is for 3PL enterprises to adopt positive supervision and financial institutions to provide positive incentives; 2) During the evolutionary process of supervision, whether a sudden change in supervisory behavior occurs is determined by the bifurcation point of the stochastic cusp catastrophe model, which in turn dictates the settings of the replenishment and liquidation points; 3) Compared to the reputational loss associated with 3PL supervision, factors such as the market price of pledged goods, the operational status of financing enterprises, and supervision costs exert a more significant influence on the replenishment point.