Judicial Appointments and Governance Efficiency: Transparency, Accountability, and Policy Lessons from India’s Collegium System

Judicial appointments form the backbone of democratic governance, influencing both institutional independence and administrative efficiency. This study critically examines India’s collegium system-a judicially evolved mechanism that grants appointment authority to senior judges to assess its impact on transparency, accountability, and governance outcomes. Drawing on twenty-one semi-structured interviews with judges, advocates, bureaucrats, academics, and law students, the research employs qualitative thematic analysis using NVivo 14. Four dominant themes emerged: transparency and accountability, efficiency and delay, diversity and legitimacy, and reform and policy learning. The findings reveal that while the collegium safeguards judicial independence, its opaque procedures and absence of codified criteria contribute to systemic inefficiencies and erode public trust. Participants expressed concern that delays in appointments and limited diversity undermine both legitimacy and justice delivery, particularly within the criminal justice system. Comparative analysis with appointment mechanisms in the United Kingdom, South Africa, and Canada indicates that hybrid, rule-based models achieve greater balance between autonomy and accountability. The study concludes that institutional reform anchored in procedural transparency, diversity, and digital disclosure-is essential for strengthening judicial credibility and governance performance. These insights underscore the broader policy lesson that independence and accountability are not contradictory but complementary principles essential to sustaining democratic legitimacy.