Deception in orbital games: simulation and dissimulation with a maneuverable decoy

This paper investigates deception in orbital games, focusing on how maneuverable decoys can manipulate players’ perception, forcing probabilistic decision-making. This paper distinguishes between physical-level concealment (stealth and camouflage) and cognitive-level deception (simulation and dissimulation), modeling it as a balance of expectation shaping, mixed strategies, and information entropy manipulation. The study proposes a game-theoretic framework that integrates perfect rationality, common knowledge, and mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, enabling the pursuer and evader to reason over probabilistic outcomes under incomplete information. A two-phase model is constructed: (1) a single-step game where agents can only maneuver once, and (2) a multi-step game involving Boyd-cycles, belief updates, and active target switching. The framework is extended to accommodate imperfect decoys through a realism coefficient, analyzing how distinguishability impacts the Nash equilibrium. Results under geostationary orbit indicate that, when the evader faces an overwhelming pursuer (maneuverability 6:1), introducing a decoy can increase the probability of its survival from almost zero to 30.8%. This study offers a foundational perspective on orbital deception beyond evasive scenarios, including feints and deception scenarios where both teams employ decoys. Findings emphasize the tactical value of cognitive deception in space security and point to future directions in robust, belief-aware game design under uncertainty.