To share or not? When sharing environmental and social responsibility meets power imbalance

The growing emphasis on environmental and social responsibility (ESR) sharing practices across supply chain members often intersects with the prevalent issue of power imbalance (e.g., manufacturer or retailer dominance), yet the interplay between these two factors has not been well explored in existing research. To address this gap, we investigate whether and how supply chain members should share ESR under the power imbalance scenarios. We develop four Stackelberg game-theoretic models incorporating dominance by either a manufacturer or a retailer, with and without ESR sharing. Our results demonstrate that the product carbon footprint (PCF) is a critical determinant. Specifically, ESR sharing enhances profitability for supply chain members when PCF is low, while abstaining from sharing is more advantageous when PCF is high. Moreover, to maximize total benefits, the focus of ESR sharing should switch between the non-dominant and dominant member as the PCF level changes. Finally, to achieve a Pareto improvement, ESR sharing is optimal strategy when PCF is low, no-sharing is optimal strategy when PCF is moderate. when PCF is high, the optimal outcome depends on the dominant member. These findings offer managers a refined framework about how to design ESR sharing strategy in power-imbalanced supply chains.